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Abstract
Despite its popular use in the U.S. legal system, research on plea bargaining and the 
factors that affect plea bargain decision-making is limited. Although it has been argued 
that plea bargaining is necessary to the efficiency of the courts (Williams-Fisher, 2005), 
critics of the practice argue that offers of leniency relative to the threat of the trial penalty 
may be coercive, so much so that even innocent defendants can be compelled to plead 
guilty (Bibas, 2004; Givelber, 1996). Others have argued that defendants are at a 
disadvantage in the negotiations because they are rarely privy to the evidence held by the 
prosecutor (Meyn, 2014). This study found that trial penalty, evidence strength, and guilt 
all had an impact on the likelihood to accept the plea. Furthermore, it sheds light on the 
different ways that guilty and innocent participants make plea deal decisions.
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The Impact of Trial Penalty and Evidence Strength on Plea Deal Decision-Making
Despite the constitutional right to trial by jury, by which an accused person will 
go free if the state cannot establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, 95% of criminal 
defendants in the United States waive this right and plead guilty (Colquitt, 2001). 
Nonetheless, our knowledge of jury trials far outweighs our understanding of guilty pleas. 
In light of recent legal critiques on the potential for plea bargains to be coercive (e.g., 
Bibas, 2004; Colquitt, 2001; Meyn 2014; Wright, 2005), there has been a renewed 
interest in plea bargaining within the psychology and law communities, specifically with 
respect to aspects of the process that may undermine a defendant’s due process rights. In 
the study reported here, I examined the impact of the size of the threatened trial penalty 
on the likelihood that a participant will accept a plea offer, in the context of varying 
levels of criminal responsibility and strength of the evidence in the case.
Most guilty pleas are the result of an agreement between a prosecutor and a 
defendant, in which the defendant exchanges a guilty plea for a reduced charge or 
sentence (Gamer, 2009). A plea bargain is, therefore, a quid pro quo exchange between 
the defendant and prosecutor meant to benefit both sides (Church, 1979): the state avoids 
the time and resource expenditure of a trial and the defendant receives a discounted 
sentence (and/or charge) in exchange for his or her guilty plea (Williams-Fisher, 2005). 
Despite a long history of antagonism by both courts and legislatures (see Williams- 
Fisher, 2005, for a review), by the middle to late 1800s plea bargaining had become the 
prominent method for the disposal of serious criminal cases in the U.S. (Feeley, 1997).
By the time the Supreme Court formally sanctioned the process in 1970 {Brady v. U.S.), 
approximately 90% of criminal cases were settled by guilty plea (Borteck, 2003).
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Proponents of plea bargaining argue that the practice allows for more efficient 
allocation of scarce resources, saves time and money and allows defendants with no 
chance of acquittal the option to receive a reduced sentence and avoid the spectacle of a 
trial (Williams-Fisher, 2005). However, plea bargaining has had no shortage of criticism 
leveled against it (e.g., Dervan, 2012; Lynch, 1994; Meyn, 2014; Wright, 2005). One of 
the most frequently raised criticisms is that offers of leniency (i.e., plea discount) can 
often be so large relative to the trial penalty (i.e., the sentence that the defendant could 
face if convicted at trial) that they can overpower the will of the defendant (e.g., Bibas, 
2004; Givelber, 1996). Furthermore, prosecutors are likely to offer the steepest discounts 
in cases wherein the evidence is least likely to support conviction at trial (and, likewise, 
defense attorneys expect steep reductions in cases they might otherwise win; Champion, 
1989; Lynch, 1994). This raises several important concerns, particularly for innocent 
defendants. For example, could the discrepancy between a trial penalty and plea offer be 
so large as to compel even an innocent defendant to plead guilty?
Plea Discount
In Brady v. US. (1970), the watershed case on the constitutionality of plea 
bargaining, the U.S. Supreme Court held that small sentence reductions are permissible 
for a defendant who is willing to plead guilty, provided that the evidence in the case 
points to obvious guilt, that the defendant makes a knowing and voluntary choice, and 
that the difference between the potential trial sentence and the plea sentence is not so 
great that the defendant “. . .  could not, with the help of counsel, rationally weigh the 
advantages of going to trial against the advantages of pleading guilty" {Brady v. U.S., 
1970, p. 3). Cases wherein there is doubt about the guilt of the defendant or about the
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ability of the prosecution to sustain its burden of proof are expected, according to Brady, 
to be reserved for trial.
Despite this apparent constitutional protection, anecdotal and empirical data show 
that weak cases are likely to be bargained away rather than dismissed or taken to trial 
(Alschuler, 1968; Bordens, 1984; Bushway, Redlich, & Norris, 2014; Caldwell, 2011; 
Champion, 1989; Gregory, Mowen, & Linder, 1978; McAllister & Bregman, 1986; 
Wright, 2005; Wright & Miller, 2002; Zottoli, Daftary-Kapur, Winters, & Hogan, 2016). 
In fact, when questioned, 82% of prosecutors and their assistants, in an early study, 
indicated that they would moderate the harshness of a plea in cases where the 
government’s evidence against a defendant is weak (Champion, 1989). Similar results 
were reported more than two decades later by Bushway et al. (2014), who manipulated 
evidence in a hypothetical robbery case presented to a national sample of judges, 
prosecutors, and defense attorneys. The plea discounts offered or expected by the 
participants increased as the probative value of the evidence in the case decreased.
While “how big a discount is too big a discount?” remains an open legal question, 
the practice of overcharging by prosecutors (i.e., charging a more serious crime than that 
for which the prosecutor expects to convict) to gain leverage in the plea bargaining 
process is thought to occur with some regularity (as discussed by Caldwell, 2011, citing 
Meares, 1995; Wright & Miller, 2002; and Wright, 2005). A recent field study on adults 
and juveniles charged with felonies in New York City supports anecdotal claims that the 
size of these discounts may be quite large (Zottoli et al., 2016). On average, adults 
received an 80% discount and youth were almost always offered probation in exchange 
for their guilty pleas, despite facing an average of 57.8 months of incarceration for the
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charges against them (Zottoli et al., 2016). There is some evidence to suggest that large 
discrepancies between plea and original charge may increase the likelihood that a 
defendant will accept a plea deal (Bordens, 1984; Gregory et ah, 1978; McAllister & 
Bregman, 1986), and innocent defendants are not immune to these effects (Givelber, 
1996). Indeed, in the Zottoli et ah (2016) study, 26.5% of the youth and 19% of the adults 
claimed to be completely innocent. Another 20.4% and 40.5%, respectively, claimed to 
be innocent of the charges against them, but guilty of what they pleaded to, suggesting 
potential overcharging on the part of prosecutors to compel guilty pleas.
Anchoring, a common cognitive heuristic, or mental shortcut, by which people 
use the first point of reference (usually a number) to make decisions about subsequent 
information (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), may partially explain these data. Initial 
charges, or even an initially high plea offer, might be used as an “anchor,” or reference, 
against which future plea offers will be compared. As a result, any reduced subsequent 
offer might be perceived as reasonable or fair, when in actuality such an offer might not 
have appeared so gracious or lenient had a more reasonable charge or sentence been 
suggested in the first place (Bibas, 2004).
Of course, from a rational perspective, the importance that a defendant places on 
the penalty if convicted at trial should be assessed in light of the likelihood of conviction. 
Indeed, the most commonly researched model of plea deal decision-making, Shadow of 
the Trial (e.g., Mnookin & Komhauser, 1979), predicts plea acceptance for any offer that 
is less than the penalty faced at trial discounted by the probability of conviction (e.g., a 
rational defendant facing a 10-year trial sentence and a 50% chance of losing at trial, 
should not accept any offer of more than 5 years). The inherent assumption in such a
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model is that the defendant can make a reasonable estimation of his likelihood of 
winning. There is no empirical basis to assume, however, that defendants can make this 
calculation reliably. Moreover, necessary information, such as the strength and quality of 
the evidence against them, is rarely provided to defendants who are considering plea 
offers, making it very unlikely that a defendant can estimate the likelihood of conviction 
(Douglass, 2001).
Knowledge of Evidence
In theory, the probability of conviction should depend on the quality and strength 
of the evidence provided to the trial jury (Gregory et al., 1978). As such, knowledge of 
the evidence that will be used against the defendant should allow him or her to make a 
reasonable estimate of his or her likelihood of being convicted. However, there are no 
federal statutes that grant defendants formal investigatory power and individual states 
vary widely in the extent to which they allow defendants access to the state’s evidence 
(i.e., discovery) prior to negotiation of a plea deal.1
Although legal scholars have discussed the importance of, and have advocated 
for, the disclosure of evidence during plea negotiations (Meyn, 2014), there is a gaping 
hole in the research on the effects of evidence disclosure. Most studies that have tested 
the effects of plea discounts on decision-making have made it relatively easy for 
participants to estimate the expected likelihood of winning at trial. To my knowledge, 
only one study has systematically examined how knowledge of the evidence affects 
decision-making in the plea context, with results suggesting that effects depend on 
various other factors in the case, such as actual guilt of the defendant and the size of the
’Furthermore, although disclosure of exculpatory evidence by the time of the trial is constitutionally 
required (Brady v. Maryland, 1963), this right has not been extended to the plea bargaining context.
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trial penalty (Daftary-Kapur & Zottoli, 2015). For example, defendants with stronger 
evidence against them were more likely to accept a plea deal. But interpretation of this 
result was complicated by the effect that trial penalty had on perception of the strength of 
the evidence: participants facing stiffer trial penalties perceived the evidence against 
them as stronger than those facing smaller trial penalties. The effects of evidence 
disclosure and evidence strength on plea deal decision-making require further study.
The Present Study
To date, it is not known how combinations of legal factors, such as knowledge of 
evidence and level of criminal responsibility might serve to aggravate or mitigate the 
potential coerciveness of a steep trial penalty. In this study, I examined the effects of 
evidence strength and trial penalty on plea deal decision-making in the context of varying 
levels of criminal responsibility. Participants were presented a brief vignette in which 
they were asked to assume the role of the defendant in a bar-fight scenario wherein a 
victim is injured and decides to press charges. The vignettes varied with respect to guilt 
of the defendant (guilty, partially guilty, innocent); strength of the evidence against the 
defendant (strong, moderate, weak); and trial penalty (high, low). Participants rated their 
likelihood of accepting the plea deal offered in the vignette and subsequently answered a 
series of follow-up questions on the factors that may have led to their decisions. These 
questions included subjective estimations of the evidence strength and their likelihood of 
winning or losing at trial, as well as the importance that the participants assigned to 
various case-specific factors, such as their own responsibility and the penalty faced if 
they lost at trial.
Hypotheses
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I hypothesized that the likelihood of pleading guilty would increase with the size 
of the trial penalty, strength of the evidence, and actual guilt. I also anticipated 
interactions between guilt and trial penalty, and between guilt and evidence strength, such 
that participants in the innocent condition would be less likely than guilty participants to 
accept plea deals overall, but that this difference would decrease for participants in the 
strong-evidence and high-penalty conditions. Given the paucity of data in this area, I 
made no hypotheses with respect to the ratings of factors that participants might have 
relied on in reaching their decisions; however, given the results of Daftary-Kapur and 
Zottoli (2015), I considered it possible that the magnitude of the trial penalty would 
influence the perception participants had of the strength of the evidence against them.
Method
Participants
Montclair State University undergraduate students (V = 727) who were enrolled 
in an introductory level psychology course were recruited through the Montclair State 
University SONA system subject pool. All participants were compensated with one credit 
toward their psychology course research participation requirement. All students enrolled 
in the SONA system were eligible to participate, provided that they were 18 years of age 
or older and fluent in English. Participants were excluded if they took less than three 
minutes to complete the study, or if they took between three and five minutes but did not 
answer the first open-ended response question, "Please explain your choice." These 
exclusion criteria were determined prior to data analyses. In total, 39 participants were 
removed, leaving a final sample of 688 participants. The mean age was 20.1 (SD = 3.7) 
and 77.6% of the sample identified as female. Fifty-seven percent of the sample
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identified as Caucasian, 13.9% as Black or African American, 1% as American Indian or 
Alaskan Native, 6.7% as Asian and 4% Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander. Thirty-three 
percent of the sample identified as Hispanic.
Procedure
The entire study was conducted online using the Qualtrics (2017) survey platform. 
After registering for the study via SONA, prospective participants were provided a link to 
the survey, where they were prompted to read an informed consent form. Upon providing 
consent, participants were asked to complete a demographics questionnaire and were then 
randomly assigned to one of 18 conditions.
Participants were next asked to imagine themselves as the character in the story 
they were assigned to read, which was written in the second person singular (i.e., you). 
After reading the vignette, participants proceeded to a decision-making questionnaire. At 
the end of the questionnaire, participants received a debriefing.
Materials
Demographics Survey. After consenting, participants were prompted to answer 
an 11 -item demographics survey (see Appendix A for the complete demographics 
survey). The demographics survey included questions about age, gender, race, and 
ethnicity of the participant, as well as family income, household size, and occupation and 
education levels of the participant and their primary caregivers (if applicable). 
Socioeconomic data were collected for purposes unrelated to the current study.
Vignettes. Participants were asked to read a brief vignette in which the participant 
is at a bar where an altercation occurs and a customer is injured. The participant is either 
directly involved, indirectly involved or not involved in a bar brawl, after which the
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participant, as the mock defendant, is arrested and charged with a crime. The trial penalty 
(i.e., charges faced) and strength of the evidence in the case were also manipulated. The 
vignette was written in the second person, singular; e.g., ". . .  as you were leaving the 
crowded bar, a man made a snide comment about your friend.” To enhance realism, the 
gender of the characters in the assigned vignette matched the gender that the participant 
indicated in the demographics survey. If no gender was indicated by the participant, the 
participant was assigned the male vignette. The vignette for the innocent + high trial 
penalty + strong evidence condition is shown below. Bold font indicates text that was 
altered across conditions; text for the other conditions follows the sample vignette. 
Sample vignettes are also provided in Appendix C.
Last weekend, you went out to your favorite bar with three close friends. It was 
your friend’s birthday, so you had a few more drinks than you usually do. As you 
were leaving the crowded bar, an argument broke out between two people at 
the bar. A man was knocked down to the floor and was bleeding because he 
hit his face on a bar stool. You bent over to help him get up, but he was 
behaving aggressively so you quickly left the bar and went home. When you got 
home, you realized you did not have your wallet.
The man ended up going to the hospital and receiving three stitches. He made a 
complaint to the police. The bar manager found your wallet at the scene and told 
the police he was “pretty sure it belonged to the guy who did it.”
You were subsequently arrested for Assault.
The prosecutor is charging you with Assault in the first degree. If found guilty at 
trial, you will be sentenced to at least 5 years in prison.
The prosecutor is willing to offer you a plea deal for a lesser charge of Menacing 
in the first degree. If you take the deal, you will have to go to prison for 1 year.
If you do not take the plea deal, you will go to trial and face the charges of 
Assault in the first degree. You need to decide whether to take the deal or go to 
trial.
Your attorney told you that in addition to the bar manager’s statement, the 
prosecutor has video surveillance from the bar. The footage clearly shows you
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bent over the injured man when he was on the floor. Your attorney also told 
you that the prosecutor is cracking down on any alcohol related crimes, and he is 
worried about your case.
Text Manipulations:
Guilt—Guilty condition. " . . . a man made a snide comment about your 
friend. You called him an unfriendly name and pushed him on purpose. He 
fell to the floor and was bleeding because he hit his face on a bar stool.
Realizing what you did . . ."
Guilt—Partially guilty condition. ". . .  a man pushed into your friend who 
pushed back, causing him to fall towards you. You pushed him away and 
he fell to the floor and was bleeding because he hit his face on a bar stool. 
Realizing what happened . . ."
Evidence— Weak strength. In the weak condition, the wallet is the only 
inculpatory evidence.
Evidence—Moderate strength. ". . .  the prosecutor said that a witness came 
forward and described a man who was wearing dark jeans and a blue 
jacket. The witness was drunk at the time, but this description fits what 
you were wearing that night."
Trial Penalty—Low. Participants in the low trial penalty condition are 
instead told that they "could get at least 2 years in prison" and "Assault in 
the second degree" as an original sentence.
Decision-Making Questionnaire. Participants were asked to rate the likelihood 
that they would accept the plea deal on a 7-point Likert-type scale that ranged from 
"Extremely Unlikely" to "Extremely Likely," and to explain their decision via an open- 
ended-format question. Next, participants were asked to rate their agreement with a series 
of statements about various case-specific factors. The questionnaire items fell roughly 
into three distinct categories: (1) importance of case-specific factors to the decision to 
plead guilty (e.g., “The amount of time I would have to spend in jail if I were found 
guilty at trial was very important to me when making my decision”); (2) beliefs about the 
case and case-related factors (e.g., “The evidence that the prosecutor had against me was
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strong”); and (3) general opinions about trials and plea deals (e.g., "In general, taking 
your chances at trial is better than taking a plea deal"). This was done using a 7-point 
Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree or extremely weak) to 7 (strongly 
agree or extremely strong). Participants were then asked to indicate any other factors that 
played a role in their decision-making that were not already asked about directly, and to 
state the single factor that was most important in making their decisions. Finally, the 
questionnaire ended with four items about the extent to which participants were able to 
visualize themselves in the vignette (e.g., "How easy was it for you to imagine yourself in 
the story?"). Responses to these final four items, as well as all qualitative/open ended 
response items, were not analyzed as part of this thesis. The entire questionnaire is 
available in Appendix B.
Planned Analyses
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests were used to evaluate main and interaction 
effects of guilt (guilty, partially guilty, innocent); strength of the evidence (strong, 
moderate, weak); and trial penalty (high, low), with respect to the likelihood to accept the 
plea deal, as well as to test the hypothesis that the trial penalty would affect perceptions 
of evidence strength. Tukey post-hoc analysis was then used to further explore significant 
findings. Finally, a series of multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) tests, with 
Bonferroni alpha value corrections, were used for the exploratory analyses concerning the 
effects of guilt, evidence strength, and trial penalty on the decision-making questionnaire 
items.
Results
Likelihood to Accept the Plea Deal
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Regarding the first hypothesis, all three independent variables significantly and 
independently affected participants' likelihood to accept a plea deal: trial penalty, F(l, 
665) = 4.20, p  = .041, r\p2 = 0.01; guilt, F(2, 665) = 68.22,/? = .000, r\p2 = .17; and 
evidence strength, F(2, 665) = 4.84,/? = .008, r|p2 = .01. Participants in the high trial 
penalty condition were more likely than those in the low trial penalty condition (Mdtff= 
.27,/? = .041, d — .014) to accept a plea deal. Post-hoc tests revealed that all three guilt 
conditions differed significantly from each other. Guilty participants were more likely to 
accept the plea deal than those in the partially guilty (Mdtff= .95,/? = .000, d = .55) and 
innocent conditions (Mdtff= 1.88,/? = .000, <7= 1.09). Similarly, participants in the 
partially guilty condition were more likely to accept the plea deal than those in the 
innocent condition (Mdtff = .93, p  = .000, d= .52). Post-hoc tests on the three evidence 
strength conditions revealed that participants in the strong evidence condition were more 
likely to accept the plea deal than those in the weak evidence condition (Mdtff = .48,/? = 
.008, d = .25), while participants in the moderate evidence condition did not differ 
significantly from those in weak or strong evidence conditions. Contrary to the second 
hypothesis, there were no significant interaction effects among these three variables. 
Effect of Trial Penalty on Perception of Strength of the Evidence
The third hypothesis was that trial penalty would have an effect on perceptions of 
the strength of the evidence. It was not supported, F( 1, 680) = .05,/? = .83, r\p2 = 0. 
Decision-Making Questionnaire
Importance of Case-Specific Factors. Table 1 contains the means and standard 
deviations for these dependent variables, broken out by condition.
Table 1 about here
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Trial penalty and guilt, but not evidence strength, significantly affected ratings of 
the importance of jail time associated with conviction at trial; trial penalty, F( 1, 661) = 
7.28,/? = .007, r\p2 = .01; guilt, F(2, 661) = 33.03,/? = .000, r|p2 = .09; evidence strength, 
F(2, 661) = 1.34,/? = .263, r|p2 = 0. Guilty participants and participants facing the high 
trial penalty were more likely to rate this factor as important to their decision compared 
to innocent (but not partially innocent) participants (p = .000) and compared to 
participants facing the low trial penalty (p = .011). Guilt also had an effect on the 
importance of jail time associated with the plea deal, F(2, 661) = 24.75,/? = .000, r|p2 = 
.07, and on the importance of the evidence in the case, F(2, 661) = 10.65, p = .000, r|p2 = 
.03. All three guilt conditions significantly differed from each other (ps < .047) on the 
importance of the plea penalty, with guilty participants most likely to agree that jail time 
associated with the plea deal was important to their decisions and innocent participants 
least likely to agree. Likewise, compared to guilty and partially guilty participants, 
innocent participants were less likely to agree that that the evidence in the case was 
important to their decision (ps < .028); guilty and partially guilty participants did not 
significantly differ from each other on importance of the evidence. Trial penalty and 
evidence strength did not have an effect on importance of jail time associated with the 
plea deal; trial penalty, F(l, 661) = 5.86,/? = .016, rjp2 = .01; evidence strength, F(2, 661) 
= 1.18,/? = .309, x]p2 = 0. These factors also did not have an effect on importance of the 
evidence in the case; trial penalty, F(l, 661) = .21,/? = .651, pp2 = 0; evidence strength,
F(2, 661) = .17,/? = .845, r|p2 = 0. Finally, there was a significant interaction between 
guilt and trial penalty on ratings of the importance that participants placed on personal 
responsibility for what happened in the bar in making their plea decisions, F(2, 661) =
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5.09,/? = .006, rjp2 = .02. All three guilt conditions significantly differed from each other, 
F(2, 661) = 39.55,/? = .000, %2 = .12, with guilty participants most likely to agree that 
their personal responsibility was important to their decisions and innocent participants 
least likely to agree (ps < .002). However, innocent participants facing the high trial 
penalty were more likely to agree that their personal responsibility was important to their 
decision compared to innocent participants in the low trial penalty condition. Trial 
penalty and evidence strength did not have a significant effect on the importance of their 
personal responsibility; trial penalty, F( 1, 661) = 1.01,/? = .315, r|p2 = 0; evidence 
strength, F(2, 661) = 34, p  = .710, rjp2 = 0. Neither guilt, trial penalty, nor strength of the 
evidence had a significant effect on the importance of having a criminal record; trial 
penalty, F(l, 661) = 4.07,/? = .044, riP2 = .01; guilt, F(2, 661) -  .47,/? = .624, riP2 = 0; 
evidence strength, F(2, 661) = .37,/? = .689, r\p2 = 0.
Beliefs about the Case. Table 2 contains the means and standard deviations for 
these dependent variables, stratified by condition.
Table 2 about here
Guilt and evidence strength, but not trial penalty, both significantly affected 
perception of the strength of the evidence; trial penalty, F(l, 648) = .01,/? = .913, r\p2 = 0; 
guilt, F(2, 648) = 36.47,/? = .000, r|p2 = .10; evidence strength, F(2, 648) = 32.96, p  — 
.000, T|p2 = .09. All groups significantly differed based on guilt and evidence, with those 
in the guilty and strong evidence conditions being most likely to agree that the evidence 
was strong and those in the innocent (ps < .004) and weak evidence conditions (ps <
.026) being least likely to agree that the evidence was strong. Guilt, with all groups 
differing, and evidence strength also had effects on the perceived fairness of the charges,
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although trial penalty did not; trial penalty, F(l, 648) = 4.48,/? = .035, %2 = .01, guilt,
F(2, 648) = 102.82,/? = .000, %2 = .24; evidence strength; F(2, 648) = 5.84,/? = .003, rjp2 
= .02. Guilty participants and those in the strong evidence condition were most likely to 
agree that the charges were fair and participants in the innocent (ps < .000) and weak 
evidence conditions (p = .005) were least likely to agree, but participants in the moderate 
evidence condition did not differ from those in the strong or weak evidence conditions. 
Both guilt and evidence strength, but not trial penalty, affected the belief that based on 
the evidence, the participant would be found guilty at trial; trial penalty. F(l, 648) = .06, 
p  = .804, T|p2 = 0; guilt, F(2, 648) = 43.07,/? = .000, %2 = .12; evidence strength, F(2, 
648) = 9.87,/? = .000, r|p2 = .03. All guilt conditions differed from each other, with those 
in the guilty condition being most likely to agree they would be found guilty at trial and 
those in the innocent condition being least likely to agree (ps < .01). Participants in the 
strong and moderate evidence conditions were more likely to believe they would be 
found guilty at trial than those in the weak evidence condition (ps < .001), but 
participants in the moderate and strong evidence conditions did not differ.
Guilt and trial penalty, but not evidence strength, significantly affected the 
perception of the fairness of the plea deal; trial penalty, F( 1, 648) = 17.18,/? = .000, r|p2 = 
.03; guilt, F(2, 648) = 26.22, p  = .000, pp2 = .08; evidence strength, F(2, 648) = 2.45,/? = 
.087, rjp2 = .01. All groups differed such that participants in the guilty and high trial 
penalty conditions were most likely to agree that the plea deal was fair and those in the 
innocent and low trial penalty conditions were least likely to agree that the plea deal was 
fair (ps < .012). There was a main effect of guilt, F(2, 648) = 165.75,/? = .000, rjp2 = .34, 
with all groups differing, on the extent to which participants felt responsible for the
IMPACT OF TRIAL PENALTY AND EVIDENCE STRENGTH 22
crime; guilty participants were most likely to agree that they felt responsible for the crime 
and innocent participants were least likely to agree (ps < .000). Trial penalty and 
evidence strength did not have an effect on the extent to which participants felt 
responsible for the crime; trial penalty, F(1, 648) = 2.20, p  = .139, T|p2 = 0; evidence 
strength, F(2, 648) = 1.09,/? = .336, r|p2 = 0. Both guilt and evidence strength, but not 
trial penalty, had effects on ratings of the strength of the evidence; trial penalty, F(l, 648) 
= 1.01,/? = .315, r|p2 = 0; guilt, F(2, 648) = 50.90,/? = .000, r|p2 = .14; evidence strength, 
F(2, 648) = 45.78,/? = .000, pp2 = .12. All three guilt conditions differed from each other, 
with guilty participants giving the highest ratings of strength of the evidence and innocent 
participants giving the lowest ratings (ps < .002). Participants in the weak evidence 
condition gave stronger ratings of the evidence than those in the strong and moderate 
conditions (ps < .000); strong and moderate evidence conditions did not differ from each 
other.
Attitudes towards Trials and Plea Deals. Table 3 contains the means and 
standard deviations for these dependent variables, broken out by condition.
Table 3 about here
Guilt and evidence strength, but not trial penalty, had significant effects on the 
opinion that taking your chances at trial is better than taking a plea deal; trial penalty;
F(1, 639) = 3.32,/? = .069, ry* = .01; guilt, F(2, 639) = 22.02,p=  .000, pp2 = .06; 
evidence strength, F(2, 639) = 6.73,/? = .001, r)p2 = .02. Innocent participants were more 
likely than guilty (p = .002) and partially guilty participants (p = .005) to believe that 
taking your chances at trial is a better option; participants in the guilty and partially guilty 
conditions did not differ from each other. There were no effects of guilt, evidence
IMPACT OF TRIAL PENALTY AND EVIDENCE STRENGTH 23
strength, or trial penalty on the belief that most people who go to trial lose (trial penalty, 
F(l, 639) = .05,p  = .833, r|p2 = 0; guilt, F{2, 639) = .64,p  = .529, %2 = 0; evidence 
strength, F(2 , 639) = .36,/? = .696, r|p2 = 0), or the belief that most people who take a plea 
deal would have lost at trial anyway (trial penalty, F(l, 639) = 2,/? = .158, r\p2 = 0; guilt, 
F(2, 639) = 1.16,/? = .313, %2 = 0; evidence strength, F(2, 639) = 1.91,/? = .149, %2 = 
.01).
Discussion
Using brief vignettes, I tested the impact of hypothetical level of criminal 
responsibility, strength of the evidence, and trial penalty on plea deal decisions. 
Participants were asked to assume the role of a defendant who was arrested and charged 
with assault for injuring a bargoer during a fight and was subsequently offered a plea 
deal. In addition, the study explored the effect of these variables on various factors that 
may have contributed to participants’ plea decisions, including the importance of case- 
specific factors, beliefs about case facts, and general attitudes towards trials and plea 
deals. (Note that these factors were treated as secondary dependent variables in this 
study; their effects on the outcome of ultimate plea decision was not evaluated as part of 
this study).
All three independent variables affected the likelihood that a participant would 
accept a plea deal, supporting the first hypothesis. Specifically, individuals were more 
likely to accept plea offers when they had high culpability, high trial penalty or when the 
evidence was strong. These data are consistent with previous findings (Bordens, 1984; 
Daftary-Kapur & Zottoli, 2015; Gregory et al., 1978; McAllister & Bregman, 1985) and 
collectively suggest that guilty defendants are more likely than innocent defendants to
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accept a plea deal, and that defendants facing a higher trial penalty are more likely to 
accept a plea deal. However, contrary to expectations, innocent defendants were not 
disproportionately affected by trial penalty and strength of the evidence variations. This 
result suggests that innocent participants may be more resilient to the potential coercive 
effects of a high trial penalty than has been suggested previously in the literature. 
However, further exploration of the decision-making questionnaire data suggests that 
innocent participants may not carefully consider factors beyond their own actual 
innocence when making their plea decisions. Innocent and guilty participants appear to 
have relied on different pieces of information about the case in reaching their decisions, 
and in some cases the data can be interpreted as suggesting that innocent defendants may 
make detrimental decisions by rejecting plea deals when faced with strong evidence that 
carries a high likelihood of conviction, or a high trial penalty.
Trial Penalty
A primary hypothesis of this study was that the likelihood of accepting a guilty 
plea would increase for defendants facing a steeper trial penalty. This hypothesis was 
supported, and consistent with that result, participants facing a higher trial penalty placed 
more importance on the jail sentence associated with a conviction at trial than those 
facing a lower trial penalty. In addition, data on the perception of the fairness of the plea 
deal revealed that participants facing the high trial penalty perceived their plea deals to be 
fairer than those facing the low trial penalty. As has been suggested by others, this effect 
of trial penalty severity on both the likelihood of pleading guilty and perception of 
fairness may be indicative of an anchoring effect (Tversky & Khaneman, 1974). This, in 
turn, has implications for charging more severe offenses that correspondingly carry more
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severe potential punishments. Anchoring, a cognitive heuristic by which individuals 
evaluate a number based on a point of reference—usually the first number suggested 
(Tversky & Khaneman, 1974)—may account for some of the observed variation in plea 
deal decision-making. Prosecutors have nearly unfettered discretion in charging decisions 
(Lynch, 1994). In practice, they may utilize this common bias in human decision-making 
by “overcharging” cases to increase the attractiveness of a plea offer relative to the trial 
penalty to increase the likelihood of securing a guilty plea. The data from this study 
suggest that defendants indeed perceive deals as fairer when the initial charge for which a 
discount is offered is higher. This is of particular concern considering that the effect of 
trial penalty was the same for innocent participants as it was for those in the guilty and 
partially guilty conditions. At the same time, however, it should be noted that the effect 
of trial penalty on the likelihood of accepting the plea deal was much smaller than the 
effect of guilt itself.
Strength of the Evidence
Participants presented with stronger evidence against them were more likely than 
those confronting weaker inculpatory evidence to accept a plea deal, and more likely to 
believe that a jury would find them guilty based on the evidence in the case. This finding 
is logical as it suggests that defendants may be using the strength of the evidence to 
rationally assess the likelihood of being convicted at trial (i.e., those with stronger 
evidence against them have a higher likelihood of being convicted at trial, and therefore 
are more likely to accept the certainty of a more lenient punishment). This suggests that 
participants were able to rationally reason about the impact that evidence strength would 
have on their cases if they decided to forgo the plea deal and take the case to trial.
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Of note, the results also suggested that regardless of the level of actual 
involvement in the crime, participants with stronger evidence against them were more 
likely to believe that the charges against them were fair. This result additionally suggests 
that with knowledge of the evidence against oneself, a defendant may be capable of 
making a rational assessment of what charges the state is considering bringing. If this is 
true, such knowledge may benefit the government and the defendant. Specifically, the 
prosecution benefits in that a reasonable plea deal may be more readily accepted by a 
knowledgeable defendant, and the defendant benefits in so far as an estimation of the 
reasonableness of a charge may temper the tendency to be influenced by a prosecutorial 
practice of overcharging. Of course, this possibility requires further empirical testing. The 
effect of strength of the evidence on the belief that a plea deal is fair raises other 
questions as well: Does the utility of evidence knowledge depend on the extent to which 
the defendant believes the justice system is charging him or her appropriately based on 
the evidence? If so, can defendants be made to perceive themselves as more culpable or a 
subsequent plea deal as more fair if they are presented with unvetted evidence by a 
prosecutor, or potentially exposed to fabricated evidence during a police interrogation? 
The results of this study only suggest that defendants can use evidence to rationally 
assess their likelihood of conviction and may use that evidence to evaluate the fairness of 
the charges against them.
At the present time, despite the assumption made by current models of plea deal 
decision-making that a defendant can reliably make an estimation of the probability of 
conviction, it is very unlikely that most defendants are able to do this in practice, given 
that defendants are rarely privy to information regarding the evidence against them at the
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time plea offers are made (Douglass, 2001). Even if the defendant is made aware of the 
evidence against him or her, it is difficult for the defendant to know if this information is 
complete, whether it will all be presented at trial, or that all the exculpatory evidence has 
been provided. This study is unique in that it demonstrates the impact of evidence 
strength on defendants’ plea-deal decisions and on factors that theoretically may relate to 
that ultimate decision. Replication of this effect, and further research on the 
aforementioned follow-up questions, is warranted.
Innocence
The strongest effect on plea deal decision-making in this study was actual guilt. 
While the plea deal decisions of innocent, partially guilty, and guilty participants were 
similarly affected by trial penalty and strength of the evidence, participants in the 
innocent condition were much less likely to accept a plea deal. This result is what might 
be expected—and desired—in weak evidence conditions wherein the defendant has a low 
likelihood of conviction at trial; indeed, these are the cases, according to Brady, that 
should be taken to trial (i.e., cases in which the culpability of the defendant is uncertain 
and the evidence is insufficient). However, study results revealed that innocent 
defendants are comparatively more resistant to plea deals even when the prosecutor has 
stronger evidence against them and when they are facing a high trial penalty.
Regardless of the strength of the evidence, guilty participants were most likely to 
perceive the evidence in their cases as being strong and to agree that they would be found 
guilty at trial based on that evidence. Because these defendants were actually guilty, it 
does not pose more than a philosophical problem when they accept an offer of leniency, 
even if that acceptance was influenced by the threat of a higher trial penalty. Innocent
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participants, on the other hand, regardless of the evidence against them, were least likely 
to view the evidence as strong, least likely to believe that they would be found guilty at 
trial based on the evidence, and most likely to believe that taking their chances at trial 
was their best option. Innocent participants were also least likely to perceive the plea deal 
as being fair regardless of whether they were in the high or low trial penalty condition, 
respectively. Plea bargaining jurisprudence accepts that there are times when an innocent 
person may be facing damning, incriminating evidence, and thus taking a plea offer is not 
only rational, but their right (Easterbrook, 1983). On the other hand, though, it can be 
argued that there are times when innocence itself might put innocent defendants at greater 
risk of losing their liberty, relative to guilty defendants who see a plea deal as a certain 
“win.” Innocent participants who might reasonably be expected to take a plea deal (i.e., 
those with strong evidence against them and facing a high trial penalty) may be making 
unwise choices (i.e., choices that present a higher risk of more negative outcomes) due to 
engaging in a less rationale assessment about how all of the factors in their case will 
impact them at trial.
Why might this effect occur? Innocent participants may simply believe that their 
own innocence will be self-evident in the court room (see Kassin, 2005, for a similar 
discussion in the interrogation context). Other plausible explanations include effects of 
overconfidence and optimism cognitive heuristics, by which individuals believe that an 
unfavorable outcome (in this situation, being convicted at trial) is less likely to happen to 
him or her (Weinstein, 1980). More specifically, when faced with a negative situation, an 
individual tends to compare him or herself to someone to whom “that sort of situation 
usually happens.” That is, a stereotypical victim who failed to control his or her situation.
IMPACT OF TRIAL PENALTY AND EVIDENCE STRENGTH 29
And the individual may thus conclude that he or she can control the future situation, 
therefore making him or herself less likely to accrue the negative outcome (Weinstein,
1980). In a plea bargaining scenario, this would involve the innocent defendant 
comparing him or herself to another wrongfully convicted defendant (which would be the 
"stereotypical victim" of an arrest) and believing that he or she, on the other hand, can 
take control of the situation by convincing the jury of his or her innocence.
While it is important that future studies focus on the problem of innocent pleas, 
especially in cases where evidence is weak and overcharging might compel false pleas, it 
is also important that studies focus on the opposite problem: that innocent defendants 
with small chances of acquittal are apt to take a very risky chance at trial, instead of 
accepting the more lenient sentence. Wrongful conviction research should not ignore this 
opposite side of the coin and hence future studies should be designed with an eye toward 
understanding the decisions made by innocent defendants.
Limitations and Future Directions
Interpretation of the results is limited by various factors, several of which are 
highlighted here. First, this study focused on the effects of evidence strength but does not 
compare these effects to a situation in which the defendant is unaware of the evidence 
against him or her. Second, the sample was not representative of the population of 
persons charged with a crime, and therefore it is hard to generalize their decisions to 
those actually facing criminal sanctions. Indeed, some participants indicated that they do 
not drink, do not go to bars often and have never been in a bar-fight situation such as the 
one described in the vignette, so it is uncertain whether the participants were able to 
imagine themselves as the character in the story. The study also lacks ecological validity
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because of the use of a vignette to simulate a scenario in which a person is arrested and 
going through legal procedures. Future studies may benefit from using a more 
ecologically valid paradigm. Notwithstanding these limitations, this study contributes to 
the growing body of knowledge on plea deal decision-making, particularly with respect 
to how strength of the evidence contributes to a mock defendant's likelihood of accepting 
a plea deal, while also suggesting potential issues regarding innocent defendants in need 
of further investigation.
Conclusion
Although the primary aim of this study was to research the effects of trial penalty 
and strength of the evidence on plea deal decision-making, a perhaps more interesting 
possibility emerged from the findings. When legal scholars discuss the innocence 
problem in plea bargaining, they typically refer to innocent defendants entering false 
guilty pleas. However, results from this study suggest that there is another innocence 
problem in plea bargaining that should be further explored; namely, that innocent 
defendants may not be accepting guilty pleas when faced with a small chance of acquittal 
at trial and a far more severe penalty. Therefore, research on the innocence problem in 
plea bargaining may prove to be more complex and nuanced than has thus far been 
recognized. The ability for the accused, whether guilty or innocent, to make an 
autonomous decision is essential to ensuring the fairness and legitimacy of the justice 
system. Therefore, it behooves the courts to ensure that aspects of the plea bargaining 
process do not overpower the will of otherwise competent defendants.
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Appendix A
Questionnaire 1 -Demographic Information 
The following questions will ask some simple demographic information:
1. Age in years:______
2. Gender: Male Female Prefer not to answer
3. Please specify your race:
___White
_ Black or African American
___American Indian or Alaska Native
___Asian
___Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
Other
4. Ethnicity. Please select one:
_ Hispanic 
___Non-Hispanic
5. What is your annual family income? Please select one:
___Less than $30,000
___$31,000-350,000
___$51,000-$ 100,000
___$101,000-150,000
___$150,000 or more
6. Number of people living in your household:_____
7. Please indicate your occupation (if not applicable, leave blank)
Not Applicable 
Unemployed
Business / Management / Finance 
Computer / Information Technology 
Architecture / Engineering 
Life / Physical / Social Sciences 
Government / Social Service 
Legal
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Education
Arts / Entertainment / Sports
Healthcare Practitioner
Law Enforcement / Protective Services
Food Preparation and Service
Maintenance
Personal Care / Service
Sales
Office / Administrative 
Farming / Fishing / Forestry 
Construction / Extraction 
Manufacturing / Production 
Transportation / Materials Moving 
Military
8. Please indicate the occupation of your primary caregiver (e.g., mother, father or 
other guardian; if not applicable, leave blank).
Not Applicable 
Unemployed
Business / Management / Finance
Computer / Information Technology
Architecture / Engineering
Life / Physical / Social Sciences
Government / Social Service
Legal
Education
Arts / Entertainment / Sports
Healthcare Practitioner
Law Enforcement / Protective Services
Food Preparation and Service
Maintenance
Personal Care / Service
Sales
Office / Administrative 
Farming / Fishing / Forestry 
Construction / Extraction 
Manufacturing / Production 
Transportation / Materials Moving 
Military
9. Please indicate the occupation of your secondary caregiver (e.g., mother, father or 
other guardian; if not applicable, leave blank).
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Not Applicable 
Unemployed
Business / Management / Finance
Computer / Information Technology
Architecture / Engineering
Life / Physical / Social Sciences
Government / Social Service
Legal
Education
Arts / Entertainment / Sports
Healthcare Practitioner
Law Enforcement / Protective Services
Food Preparation and Service
Maintenance
Personal Care / Service
Sales
Office / Administrative 
Fanning / Fishing / Forestry 
Construction / Extraction 
Manufacturing / Production 
Transportation / Materials Moving 
Military
10. What is the highest degree or level of schooling you have completed? If currently 
enrolled in college, you would choose “High School Diploma” (Please select one)
___Less than high school
__ Some high school, no diploma
__ High school diploma or the equivalent (for example: GED)
__ High School and Trade/Technical/Vocational training
__ Some college credit, no degree
___Associate’s degree
___Bachelor’s degree
___Master’s level degree (e.g., MA/MS/MBA)
__ Terminal/Doctoral level degree (e.g., Ph.D./M.D./J.D.)
11. What is the highest degree or level of school completed by anyone in your 
household? For example, if your mother has a college degree and your father has 
a high school degree, you would select “college degree”? (Please select one)
__ Less than high school
___Some high school, no diploma
__ High school diploma or the equivalent (for example: GED)
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High School and Trade/Technical/Vocational training 
Some college credit, no degree 
Associate’s degree 
Bachelor’s degree
Master’s level degree (e.g., MA/MS/MBA) 
Terminal/Doctoral level degree (e.g., Ph.D./M.D./J.D.)
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Appendix B
Questionnaire 2- Plea Deal Decision-Making
Considering what you have just read, please answer the following questions:
Extremely
unlikely
Unlikely Somewhat
unlikely
Neither
likely
nor
unlikely
Somewhat
likely
Likely Extremely
likely
How likely 
would you 
be to accept 
a plea deal?
Please explain your choice:
People think about a lot of different things when they are deciding whether or not to take 
a plea deal.
Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements about 
the event in the bar, your charges and your decision.
Strongly
disagree
Disagree Somewhat
disagree
Neither
agree
nor
disagree
Somewhat
agree
Agree Strongly
agree
The amount of 
time I would 
have to spend 
in jail if I were 
found guilty at 
trial was very 
important to 
me when 
making my 
decision.
The amount of 
time I would 
have to spend 
in jail if I 
accepted the 
plea deal was 
very important 
to me when 
making my 
decision.
Whether or not 
I would have a 
criminal
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records was 
very important 
to me when 
making my 
decision.
The evidence 
the prosecutor 
had against me 
was very 
important to 
me when 
making my 
decision.
The evidence 
that the
prosecutor had 
against me was 
strong.
Considering 
what I did at 
the bar, the 
charges filed 
against me 
were fair.
Based on the 
evidence in my 
case, I would 
be found guilty 
at trial.
The plea deal 
that the 
prosecutor 
offered to me 
was fair.
My
responsibility 
for what 
happened to the 
victim in the 
bar was very 
important to 
me when 
making my 
decision.
I felt that I was 
responsible for 
what happened 
to the victim in 
the bar.
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Extremely
weak
Weak Somewhat
weak
Moderate Somewhat
strong
Strong Extremely
Strong
Rate the 
strength of 
the evidence 
that the 
prosecutor 
had against 
you.
Strongly
disagree
Disagree Somewhat
disagree
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree
Somewhat
agree
Agree Strongly
agree
In general, 
taking your 
chances at 
trial is better 
than taking a 
plea deal.
Most people 
who go to 
trial lose.
Most people 
who take plea 
deals 
probably 
would have 
lost at trial 
anyway.
If you considered anything else in making your decision, please indicate these factors 
here:
What was the single most important reason for your decision?
Finally, please answer the following questions about your ability to imagine yourself in 
the story.
How easy was it for you to imagine yourself in the story?
_ It was easy for me to imagine myself in the story
___It was not easy to imagine myself in the story, but I was able to do it
___It was very hard to imagine myself in the story, but I was able to do it
_ I tried, but I could not imagine myself in the story
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__ I imagined someone else I know in the story, because it was too hard to
imagine myself
_ I did not try to imagine myself or someone else I know in the story
How often do you go to bars?
__ Never
___Rarely
___Sometimes
Often
How often do you drink alcohol?
__ Never
__ Rarely
__ Sometimes
Often
Have you ever been in a bar-fight situation like the one described in the story?
__ No, and I cannot imagine something like that ever happening to me
__ No, but I could imagine something like that possibly happening to me
Yes
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Appendix C
Sample 1: Guilty/High Trial Penalty/Strong Evidence
Last weekend, you went out to your favorite bar with three close friends. It was your 
friend’s birthday, so you had a few more drinks than you usually do. As you were leaving 
the crowded bar, a man made a snide comment about your friend. You called him an 
unfriendly name and pushed him on purpose. He fell to the floor and was bleeding 
because he hit his face on a bar stool. Realizing what you did, you bent over to help him 
get up, but he was behaving aggressively so you quickly left the bar and went home. 
When you got home, you realized you did not have your wallet.
The man ended up going to the hospital and receiving three stitches. He made a 
complaint to the police. The bar manager found your wallet at the scene and told the 
police he was “pretty sure it belonged to the guy who did it.”
You were subsequently arrested for Assault.
The prosecutor is charging you with Assault in the first degree. If found guilty at trial, 
you will be sentenced to at least 5 years in prison.
The prosecutor is willing to offer you a plea deal for a lesser charge of Menacing in the 
first degree. If you take the deal, you will have to go to prison for 1 year.
If you do not take the plea deal, you will go to trial and face the charges of Assault in the 
first degree. You need to decide whether to take the deal or go to trial.
Your attorney told you that in addition to the bar manager’s statement, the prosecutor has 
video surveillance from the bar. The footage clearly shows you bent over the injured man 
when he was on the floor. Your attorney also told you that the prosecutor is cracking 
down on any alcohol related crimes, and he is worried about your case.
Sample 2: Partially Guilty/High Trial Penalty/Moderate Evidence
Last weekend, you went out to your favorite bar with three close friends. It was your 
friend’s birthday, so you had a few more drinks than you usually do. As you were leaving 
the crowded bar, a man pushed into your friend who pushed back, causing him to fall 
towards you. You pushed him away and he fell to the floor and was bleeding because he 
hit his face on a bar stool. Realizing what happened, you bent over to help him get up, 
but he was behaving aggressively so you quickly left the bar and went home. When you 
got home, you realized you did not have your wallet.
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The man ended up going to the hospital and receiving three stitches. He made a 
complaint to the police. The bar manager found your wallet at the scene and told the 
police he was “pretty sure it belonged to the guy who did it.”
You were subsequently arrested for Assault.
The prosecutor is charging you with Assault in the first degree. If found guilty at trial, 
you will be sentenced to at least 5 years in prison.
The prosecutor is willing to offer you a plea deal for a lesser charge of Menacing in the 
first degree. If you take the deal, you will have to go to prison for 1 year.
If you do not take the plea deal, you will go to trial and face the charges of Assault in the 
first degree. You need to decide whether to take the deal or go to trial.
Your attorney told you that in addition to the bar manager’s statement, the prosecutor 
said that a witness came forward and described a man who was wearing dark jeans and a 
blue jacket. The witness was drunk at the time, but this description fits what you were 
wearing that night. Your attorney also told you that the prosecutor is cracking down on 
any alcohol related crimes, and he is worried about your case.
Sample 3: Innocent/Low Trial Penalty/Weak Evidence
Last weekend, you went out to your favorite bar with three close friends. It was your 
friend’s birthday, so you had a few more drinks than you usually do. As you were leaving 
the crowded bar, an argument broke out between two people at the bar. A man was 
knocked down to the floor and was bleeding because he hit his face on a bar stool. You 
bent over to help him get up, but he was behaving aggressively so you quickly left the bar 
and went home. When you got home, you realized you did not have your wallet.
The man ended up going to the hospital and receiving three stitches. He made a 
complaint to the police. The bar manager found your wallet at the scene and told the 
police he was “pretty sure it belonged to the guy who did it.”
You were subsequently arrested for Assault.
The prosecutor is charging you with Assault in the second degree. If found guilty at trial, 
you will be sentenced to at least 2 years in prison.
The prosecutor is willing to offer you a plea deal for a lesser charge of Menacing in the 
first degree. If you take the deal, you will have to go to prison for 1 year.
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If you do not take the plea deal, you will go to trial and face the charges of Assault in the 
second degree. You need to decide whether to take the deal or go to trial.
Your attorney told you that besides the bar manager’s statement, the prosecutor had no 
other evidence against you. Your attorney also told you that the prosecutor is cracking 
down on any alcohol related crimes, and he is worried about your case.
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Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations o f the Impact o f Guilty, Strength o f the Evidence, and 
Trial Penalty on the Importance o f Case-Specific Factors
Guilt Strength of the Evidence Trial Penalty
Guilty 
(n = 
229)
Partially 
Guilty 
(n = 222)
Innocent 
(n = 228)
Strong 
(n = 224)
Moderate 
(n = 227)
Weak 
(n = 228)
High 
(n = 340)
Low
(n = 339)
Importance of 6.28 6.00 5.28 5.96 5.86 5.75 6.00 5.71
the time spent 
in jail if 
found guilty 
at trial
(.99 )a (1.29)b (1.76)ab (1.35) (1.40) (1.58) (1.40)a (1.48)a
Importance of 6.25 5.95 5.37 5.97 5.82 5.78 5.98 5.73
the time spent 
in jail if I 
accept the 
plea deal
(l)a (1.29)a (1.73)a (1 31) (1.46) (1.48) (1.40) (1.43)
Importance of 5.55 5.7(1.56) 5.65 5.71 5.61 5.58 5.76 5.50
having a 
criminal 
record
(1.57) (1.79) (1.61) (1.63) (1.69) (1.60) (1.67)
Importance of 5.93 5.65 5.31 5.67 5.60 5.61 5.60 5.65
the evidence 
against me
(1.12)a (1.33)b (1.76)ab (1.52) (1.43) (1.4) (1.42) (1.48)
Importance of 5.00 4.48 3.67 4.45 4.36 4.33 4.45 4.32
my (1.40)a (1.61)a (1.84)a (1.77) (1.66) (1.72) (1.66) (1.77)
responsibility__________ ___________________________________________________________________
Note. “Denotes levels of a variable that differ significantly at the .05 alpha level. bDenotes levels of a 
variable that differ significantly at the .05 alpha level. Cohen's ¿/overall ranged from .19-.81 for significant 
effects; trial penalty, d=  .19; guilt, d>  .22.
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Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations o f the Impact o f Guilty, Strength o f the Evidence, and 
Trial Penalty on the Beliefs about the Case
Guilt Strength of the Evidence Trial Penalty
Guilty 
(n = 224)
Partially 
Guilty 
(n = 217)
Innocent 
(n = 225)
Strong 
(n = 219)
Moderate 
(n = 222)
Weak 
(n = 225)
High 
(n = 333)
Low
(n = 333)
The
evidence 
against me 
was strong
4.95
(1.68)a
4.08
(1.88)a
3.53
(1.97)a
4.80
(1.85)a
4.32
(1.83)a
3.45
(1.88)a
4.18
(1.94)
4.19
(1.93)
The 
charges 
against me 
were fair
4.30 
( 1.71 )a
2.91
(1.78)a
2.08
(1.57)a
3.36
(1.96)a
3.12
(1.92)
2.82
(1.85)a
3.24
(1.96)
2.96
(1.87)
Based on 
the
evidence. I 
would be 
found 
guilty at 
trial
4.74
(1.58)a
3.80
(1.66)a
3.35
(1.73)a
4.17
(1.72)a
4.16
(1.72)b
3.57
(1.75)ab
3.95
(1.78)
3.98
(1.72)
The plea 
deal was 
fair
4.43
(1.63)a
3.77
(1.69)a
3.30
(1.76)a
4.01
(1.77)
3.82
(1.74)
3.66
(1.73)
4.10
(1.73)a
3.57
(1.73)a
I felt
responsible
4.86
(1.57)a
3.35
(1.82)a
2.06
(1.54)a
3.54
(2.06)
3.41
(1.98)
3.31
(1.99)
3.52
(2.07)
3.23
(1.95)
Rating of 
the strength
4.64
(1.43)a
3.76
(1.51)a
3.28
(1.67)a
4.39
(1.58)a
4.15
(1.54)b
3.15
(1.54)ab
3.95
(1.61)
3.84
(1.65)
of the
evidence______ ___ __________________________________________________________________
Note. aDenotes levels of a variable that differ significantly at the .05 alpha level. bDenotes levels of a 
variable that differ significantly at the .05 alpha level. Cohen's d overall ranged from .23-1.82 for 
significant effects; trial penalty, d -  .31; guilt, d > .28; evidence strength, d > .23.
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Table 3
Means and Standard Deviations o f the Impact o f Guilty, Strength o f the Evidence, and 
Trial Penalty on Attitudes toward Trials and Plea Deals
Guilt Strength of the Evidence Trial Penalty
Guilty 
(« = 219)
Partially 
Guilty 
(« = 218)
Innocent 
(« = 220)
Strong 
(« = 214)
Moderate 
(« = 221)
Weak 
(« = 222)
High 
(« = 329)
Low
(« = 328)
Taking
your
chances at 
trial is 
better than 
taking a 
plea deal
3.85
(1.49)a
4.36
(1.53)a
4.81
(1.54)a
4.16
(1.56)a
4.22
(1.55)b
4.64
(1.56)ab
4.23
(1.51)
4.45
(1.61)
Most
people who 
go to trial 
lose
3.69
(1.23)
3.72
(1.29)
3.59
(1.23)
3.73
(1.09)
3.63
(1.26)
3.66
(1.38)
3.68
(1.27)
3.66
(1.23)
Most
people who
4.13
(1.43)
3.93
(1.40)
3.98
(1.57)
4.17
(1.41)
3.95
(1.50)
3.92
(1.48)
4.1
(1.52)
3.94
(1.41)
take plea 
deals
would lose
at trial____________________________________________________________________________________
Note. aDenotes levels of a variable that differ significantly at the .05 alpha level. bDenotes levels of a 
variable that differ significantly at the .05 alpha level. Cohen's d overall ranged from .27-.63 for significant 
effects; guilt, d>  .27; evidence strength, d>  .28.
